Current thinking on African conflicts suffers from misinterpretations (oversimplification, lack of focus, lack of conceptual clarity, state-centrism and lack of vision). The paper analyses a variety of the dominant explanations of major international actors and donors, showing how these frequently do not distinguish with sufficient clarity between the 'root causes' of a conflict, its aggravating factors and its triggers. Specifically, a correct assessment of conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors is of vital importance in Africa's lingering confrontations. Broader approaches (e.g. "structural stability") offer a better analytical framework than familiar one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, for explaining and dealing with violent conflicts a shift of attention from the nation-state towards the local and sub-regional level is needed.
Introduction
In Africa south of the Sahara, we are confronted with enduring violent conflicts in which a clear understanding of the reasons of continuation is as important as knowing about the origins. Current thinking on African conflicts is still influenced by a tendency to focus predominantly on 'root causes' of violent conflict whose resolution is frequently beyond reach. Conventional wisdom about violent conflict in Africa is still dictated by either ideological preferences or narrow institutional interests. The dominance of two competing explanatory approaches -'poverty' and 'greed' -is not reflecting accurately what happens on the ground. Current discourses about conflict prevention might lead to very mechanical and technocratic responses to varying challenges, exacerbating an already inherent tendency in the aid business: over-simplification. However, the biggest flaw in technocratic official development assistance (ODA) related thinking is the focus on the nation-state, when an essential part of the problem (and maybe even the solution) might be found on two other levels: in the local and the sub-regional arenas.
Familiar conflict escalation patterns might stress this problem. In fact, African (and most other) conflicts spread in two ways: -horizontally (territorial spread) -the crisis in the Great Lakes region is felt several thousand miles away from Lake Kivu; the Ivorian crisis has, within a few months, affected the whole sub-region of West Africa; and - vertically (in intensity) -the Rwandan genocide might not be the last on the continent. Extreme forms of violence (e.g. atrocities in the Sierra Leone civil war) and a growing number of victims in, by definition, local conflicts (e.g. in Nigeria) attest to this.
Yet, the responses by the international community do not sufficiently address escalation patterns and the endurance of conflict. Additionally, new actors (e.g. private security firms 1 ) and new arenas of the political game (e.g. large-scale refugee camps) emerge -policy-makers and academia alike will have to react to this. A growing literature on so-called 'new wars' tries to reflect these tendencies while it is not always clear how 'new', or rather, for how long undetected the phenomena really are. Typically, the Angolan civil war was predominantly 1 Contrasting positions can be found in Musah and Fayemi 2000 , Cilliers and Cornwell 1999 , Lock 1998 , Howe 1998 , and West Africa, 18-24 September 2000.
interpreted as a proxy war during the 1980s (that is during the East-West bloc confrontation), and as an example for the 'economy of war'-thesis in the late 1990s.
Finally, one of the main shortcomings of external involvement is its short-sighted 'crisis response' nature; instead, what is needed is a thorough understanding of an adapted 'peace order'. This paper argues that there are roughly four problems that need to be addressed if conflict prevention policy in Africa is to lead to more positive results in the future:
1. In academia and practice there is a dangerous mix-up of types of conflict causes:
While an understanding of 'root causes' or their main expressions is vital for a correct analysis, an understanding of escalation patterns and a correct assessment of 'conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors' should inform concrete short-term action.
2. There is nearly no common understanding of conflict causes by international actorsleading to incoherent, uncoordinated and therefore ineffective action.
3. There is a lack of vision (locally and internationally) about the final goals when engaging in conflict prevention. Without a holistic view of African societies' capacities to live in peace with themselves and their neighbours, any well-meant action might simply fail to produce effects.
4.
There is an exaggerated focus on the African nation-state. A parallel shift of perspective in conflict analysis, prevention and resolution from the national towards the local and the sub-regional level is necessary. A good number of current conflicts have trans-boundary effects, but start locally (Engel/Mehler 2005 ). This paper is organised as follows: Following this introduction, the second section argues for a correct differentiation of conflict causes -stressing the importance of conflict prolonging factors. These are specified in some detail in the third section. The fourth section deals with 'official' conceptions of (African) conflicts and conflict prevention by some major actorsshowing that the 'conventional wisdom' is not even a homogeneous one. Finally, section five, by drawing conclusions and giving some perspectives, develops core aspects of a practical and heuristic leitmotiv helping to situate preventive strategies and activities in the coordinate system of a forward-looking approach of contributing to a 'peace order' or 'structural stability'. It argues for re-assessing the role of the nation-state level as much in analysis as in practical aid, calling attention towards the local and sub-regional levels.
The Case for Adequate Differentiation of Conflict Causes
The state of knowledge on the causation of African conflicts in academia is far from being satisfactory. Different schools of thought still tend to ignore each other and follow incomplete sets of research questions: Some of the rare researchers working on African conflicts worked with the 'universalist' approaches of peace research developed mainly in the context of the Cold War and the OECD world (Reychler 1997) . Others picked very specific segments of explanatory factors: either the result of ethno-regionally, economically or politically motivated excessive demands to increasingly inefficient governments (Zartman 1985 , Joseph 1999 . Poverty is a simplistic (but welcome) explanation for violent conflict offered by some researchers. 2 Failure of clientelist integration after flawed reforms of neo-patrimonial systems is still another offered explanation. 3 More complex schemes distinguish a) conflict patterns associated with the competition over the control of the state and rare resources, from b) calls for autonomy/independence or other demands by particular social groups, also adding the historical factor of the end of the East-West confrontation with its consequential loss of patronage once exerted by external powers (leading to the destabilisation of some authoritarian regimes). 4 The author believes that an even more differentiated list of problem areas as manifestations of highly abstract root causes (developed elsewhere, see van de Goor et al. 2001 ) is needed in order to distil typical chains of causation -from 'root causes', aggravating or accelerating factors to conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors and triggers:
1. root causes of conflict are underlying characteristics arising from historical dominant economical, political and social institutions, practices or other dispositions; 2. aggravating or accelerating factors refer to aspects and circumstances, which contribute to a (re-)escalation of a conflict situation. These factors emerge medium-term; 3. conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors contribute to the predominance of logics of war over logics of peace after an escalation of violence has taken place. Sustaining war efforts essentially depend on economic, institutional and ideological rationales; 4. triggers aren't the (root) causes of conflict but constitute more proximate events or factors and create situations, in which a violent escalation of conflict occurs.
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See the largely economist contributions in Journal of African Economies, 9 (2000) 3 (Special Issue/Economic Commission for Africa Policy Issue: Conflict); and Solomon 1999 . For Copson (1994 , poverty is a 'contributing factor', while the main reason of conflict are varying forms of contradictions between state and society. See Allen 1999 (with a discussion of further explanatory elements: new barbarism; economies of war; globalisation approaches; approaches using social, cultural and individual factors) and Schlichte 1996. On neo-patrimonialism see van de Walle 2001, Chabal and Daloz 1999. 4 Matthies 1998 highlights additional problems of nation-building and elements of group mobilisation. Patterns of mobilisation are important as well for Lemarchand 2001. One example might be enough to explain the need to differentiate conflict causes 5 : A typical (root) cause of violent conflict in Africa south of the Sahara is the emergence of an exclusive government elite: It can be characterised briefly: Key decision-making positions in the presidency, cabinet, parliament, military and judiciary do not include representatives of major identity groups. In addition, most jobs in the civil service, police force and army are reserved for members of one or two specific groups. Different dynamics may start from this point of departure: 1. A continuation of the main conflict aided by institutional devices excluding minorities (e.g. high thresholds to win mandates in Parliament); those could become a conflict-prolonging factor (although not necessarily on a violent level); 2. There could be a tendency to even further contract the political arena, particularly when economic crisis affects a given state-apparatus. Already privileged circles usually have better means to keep their jobs, privileges, access to opportunities etc. in times of crisis -and exclusion could become a rational strategy by those. But exclusion is a radical strategy and is likely to be countered by equally radical strategies on the part of those excluded. If the formal political process does not provide for a solution, the excluded elite groups will tend to initiate attempts to overthrow the regime (Burundi is a classical example). In particular, formerly privileged elite groups pushed aside or prosecuted by a new elite will more likely be tempted by violent adventures (the Yakoma followers of ex-president Kolingba in Central African Republic under the rule of Ange-Félix Patassé offer a typical case).
What then are the patterns of escalation? At first, a specific group might simply enjoy privileged access to strategic positions. Gradually, the government payroll is 'homogenised'; and only one group is left represented (example: the last years of Habyarimana rule in Rwanda when not only Hutu, but particularly those from his home region, occupied most important positions) -this clearly represents an aggravating factor. If elections are held, marginal groups vote unsuccessfully for opposition parties headed by excluded elite groups. These leaders go underground and organise armed challenges to the incumbent regime. Disloyal conduct increases and leads to further polarisation. A composite power-base of the regime might split, leaving only a minority in power (arguably this happened in the last year of Patassé's reign in Central African Republic after the forced defection of then chief of staff Gen. Bozizé). In the final stage, pogroms and ethnic cleansing begin to occur, representing the triggering event and the entry into a new level of escalation.
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The CPN 'practical guide' (op. cit.) distinguishes 17 so-called problem-areas with respective escalation patterns.
Conflict Prolonging Factors
The mainstream thinking of conflict resolution believes that conflicts attain a moment of 'ripeness for resolution' (Zartman 1985) . But these moments arrive late, if at all. In many contemporary conflicts, de-escalation is frequently merely temporary, while the antagonists prepare for the next battle. Most of the factors shortly presented hereafter have obviously gained in importance during the last decade. One very influential approach is the 'political economy of war' approach. In an extreme form, which is its 'greed' hypothesis propagated by several writings of the economists Collier and Hoeffler, this approach is ultimately reduced to the personal ambitions of warlords and political entrepreneurs. In resource-rich African states there are indeed possibilities to fund war efforts or to make 'easy money' under war conditions. But curiously enough, 'greed' (meaning the search for opportunities for predation, like the control of primary commodity exports) is portrayed as the (major) conflict cause, while it should appropriately be classified as a prolonging factor or 'fuel' of conflict.
Several writers with an African studies background have heavily criticised the Collier/Hoeffler approach. Marchal and Messiant (2002) have decried the inherent narrow perspective and methodological flaws. Mkandawire (2002: 190) Collier et al. (2003) have now differentiated their thoughts, but still remain in a largely econometric rationale (as criticized by Lemarchand 2003) . Richards and Vlassenroot (2002) show how a sociological approach inspired by Durkheim would, for instance, shift the 'exaltation' aspect of African conflicts to the foreground.
In sum, there is reason to believe that economic factors are central to understanding the endurance of conflicts (although they are not the only ones, see the institutional factor of electoral rules above), but they do not necessarily reveal anything about the emergence of conflict. And: By no means should economic factors be reduced to the 'greed' explanation. A small overview of a selection of typical war-prolonging factors in African circumstances might support this argument:
Oil and Warfare
There are quite a few oil-producing countries in Africa that have experienced violent conflict.
Oil resources/revenues-and this is a more complex argument than the 'greed' thesis -can become a motive to circumvent democracy, since governments gain far more from rents and royalties than from taxes by their own ordinary citizens (Herb 2003 , Moore 2004 , Ross 2001 , 2003a /b, Snyder/Bhavnani 2004 . Thus, they tend to be less responsive to demands for participation (virtually all oil economies in Africa: Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, and as a newcomer: Chad). In this sense they can be at the origin of violent conflict. More often, however, oil resources rather serve to prolong conflicts: -Royalties or other oil-related transfers can be used to buy arms or reinforce military capacities to continue violent conflict (Chad, Angola, Sudan).
Oil producers in conflict zones get involved in ongoing wars. Their premises are used for military interventions (Sudan), they may side willingly or unwillingly with conflict parties (Congo-Brazzaville).
Despite the generally assumed 'resource curse' or the 'paradox of plenty' (which often refers to oil besides other natural resources like diamonds etc.) one has to stress the fact, that, "whether oil or other resources turn out to be beneficial or detrimental to a country's socioeconomic and political development depends on a fairly dynamic and complex interplay of contextual variables" (Basedau 2005: 22) .
The 'resource curse' is not destiny, as Ross (2003a) and Basedau (2005) point out. Country specific and resource specific conditions have to be taken into account.
Illegal Trafficking of Precious Resources
Precious resources, like diamonds, gold, hardwood or other rare natural resources are transiting national frontiers illegally. Warlords are generally military entrepreneurs in search of control of the production sites and trade routes of these commodities. This, today, is conventional wisdom. However, trade profits essentially permit the continuation of politicocommercial strategies, they rarely represent 'square one' in a complicated game. 6 Governments in weak states tend to be corrupted slowly, but pervasively by criminal networks and might become actors in violent conflict (Debiel 2002) . Once again: it is misleading to start conflict analysis only with the effects of illegal trafficking. It might be essential to address them, but this needs to be done, as well, by looking into the conditions of their emergence (including the weakness of the African state). Again context matters. 6 Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2003) find that in several cases under scrutiny, actors prefer low intensity conflict to outright victory, minimising direct losses and increasing the direct gains (booty).
Small Arms and War as a Profession
Small arms are available at low cost in expanding zones around escalated conflicts. The most common approach to the problem is the regulation of arms exports from Northern countries.
This conventional way of addressing small arms proliferation is of limited value: Small arms and ammunition are produced as well in other, including African countries (e.g. RSA). More importantly, the destruction of weapons necessitates their prior collection, an activity which frequently demands material input by donor organisations ('arms for cash'), which in turn may be an incentive for becoming a fighter in the first place ('demobilisation rent'): arms collection, demobilisation and reintegration schemes might have perverse (conflict prolonging) effects, if beneficiaries are exclusively those who took up arms in the first place. In enduring conflicts, becoming a fighter is -on an individual level -a rational alternative to less promising opportunities on the labour market, particularly for male youth. Fighters may not necessarily be paid, but live from armed blackmail and looting. The traumatising effects of violence is particularly harmful for children and adolescents. This may be the starting point for a 'career' from victim to perpetrator and thus a 'conflict prolonging factor' or a 'conflict reproducing factor'.
Declining States
Some African states were simply juridical fictions when they became independent, others turned gradually into façade states. This is not only a conflict cause, it also has consequences for conflict resolution: In the absence of responsible governments there are often no credible partners for peace negotiations -a conflict prolonging factor. Another aspect of conflict prolongation is the gradual replacement of the -at least claimed -monopoly of violence by a multiplication of actors in continued "need" to prove their capacity of violence in order to command respect and allegiance. The case of Somalia remains an extreme case, where the absence of a state -despite numerous efforts to support local 'peace constituencies' -clearly proved to be to the detriment of peace in large parts of the country.
Diaspora and Other Factors
The existence of a diaspora sustaining war efforts from abroad might be an additional conflict prolonging factor, as could be certain ideologies, revenge cultures or religions. Some conflict prolonging factors are associated with the aid business (Uvin 1998 (Uvin , 2001 Anderson 1999 ). This enumeration is certainly not exhaustive.
Conflict prolonging factors might be more visible, more salient to those concerned and more modifiable than 'root causes' as argued above. And since the endurance of war creates im-mense costs, there is every reason to deal with these causes in a much more systematic way than experienced thus far. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that violence attributable directly to 'root causes' would simply disappear when the 'fuel' is taken out of a conflict arena. After the outbreak of violence, the answer seems to be clear: Dealing first with prolonging factors and addressing root causes immediately afterwards. It would be better still to prevent triggering events first, but they can hardly be predicted.
The Diverging and Simplistic Understanding of Conflict Causes by International Actors
The practitioner's understanding of violent conflict is frequently informed by official perspectives. However, we observe severe flaws and distinctive variations in the analysis of the causes of violent conflict in Africa by major external actors which could lead to short-sighted and contradictory policies by national governments and international organisations. Some typical positions of certain major actors should be briefly reported and commented, although there are difficulties in finding texts that can at least roughly be compared and are significant in themselves: Not all the actors have similarly grounded policy papers; some address conflict causes only in an implicit way. Very often the policy is outlined without a reference to some prior analytical work. Some of the policy papers and programmatic declarations used here are not Africa-specific (focusing on the developing world), but certainly cover the African continent -which raises the question of whether they are specific enough to address concrete conflicts. 7 7 It will be focused on the international donors. Further research should address the conceptualisation of violent conflicts done by the African Union, subregional organisations and major INGOs.
The United Nations
With regard to the continuum conflict prevention -peace-enforcement, the United Nations can claim considerable authority worldwide (Barnett 2001 
The European Union
The EU has rhetorically endorsed conflict prevention relatively early on (in 1995), particularly with regard to Africa.
Drawing on Council Conclusions from 1998 the EU's Conflict Prevention Network cited 1)
imbalance of political, socio-economic or cultural opportunities among different identity groups, 2) lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance, 3) absence of opportunities for the peaceful conciliation of group interests and for bridging dividing lines 8 Under the agenda title "New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support: causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa" the United Nations General Assembly presented on September 5, 2003 a follow-up report "Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and development in Africa". Here the UN addresses specific follow-up actions taken since 1998 and identifies further challenges and obstacles for the implementation of the recommendations made by the Secretary-General. (http://www.un.dk/doc/ a58352.pdf, access 12/22/2004). The UNDP has commissioned an interesting independent study (Wood 2001 (Wood ), updated in 2003 In the absence of a more official paper the Annan-Report 1998 and its follow-ups seems to be its current position. Current research is been done by the "War-TornSocieties Transition Programm" (WSP-TP) (http://www.wsp-international.org/index.htm). Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament (Rapporteur: Joost Lagendijk) considers that 'a further step could be taken by assessing and preventing the impact that certain major decisions adopted in the framework of the common policies of the Union could have as direct or indirect causes of certain conflicts, namely by distorting or even annihilating the economic and social structure of the poorest countries' (A5-0394/2001, RR\302075 EN.doc). 11 A EU Presidency Statement on conflicts in Africa at the UN security council (May 30, 2003) confirms the unspecified concern with all sorts of conflict causes put on the same level of explanation: 'Identifying and addressing the multidimensional root causes of conflict in Africa is another important element in the long fight towards peace and stability in the region. Dealing with issues like, inter alia, socio-economic inequities and inequalities, systematic ethnic discrimination, denial of human rights, disputes over political participation or long-standing grievances over land, the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons and the illegal exploitation of natural resources is of critical importance in the process of moving from conflict management to prevention and final resolution' (http://europa-eu-un. 
The World Bank
The World Bank has for a long time preferred to work on conflict consequences (only in postconflict scenarios) and not on conflict causes. Nevertheless, towards the late 1990s the Bank has redefined its role and shifted its approach from one that focused on rebuilding infrastructure to one that seeks to understand the root causes of conflict, to integrate a sensitivity to conflict in Bank activities and to promote assistance that minimizes the potential causes of conflict. The Bank's more recent report "Breaking the Conflict Trap" argues against a greed-based interpretation of rebellion. "Loot is not usually the root motivation for conflict, but it may become critical to its perpetuation, giving rise to the conflict trap" (Collier et al 2003: 79) . This acknowledgment of a separate meaning of conflict prolonging factors deserves recognition.
The report claims inter alia that stagnant or declining low-income countries face a high risk of conflict and that countries in the first decade of post-conflict peace face exceptionally high risks to fall back into conflict. It is difficult to escape the conflict trap -conflict breeds con- physical, economic, social and institutional dislocation, and the choices they must make are correspondingly more difficult" (World Bank 2004: 14) .
The solution proposed in 2003 sounded straightforward: the effect of a package of policy reform and increased aid on the average aid-recipient country would reduce the risk of conflict (without giving convincing explanations for this and obviously offering good additional advice). But the assertiveness is in decline: "There is no consensus, let alone best practices, on how to integrate the conflict nexus or the key elements of conflict-affected PRSP processes."
The World Bank begins to consider its own homework: "Economic policies also need to be more flexible, taking into account the specific constraints resulting from conflict and the primary objective of ensuring peace and political stability" (World Bank 2004: 14-15 countries and weak governance environments miss to (or seldom) address the underlying root causes of violent conflicts, and the specific characteristics of poverty, related to these violent conflicts. Therefore care should be taken on alignment and harmonisation of the PRSPs and the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF). 14 It is in fact the bringing together of all its knowledge in compatible forms and their coordinated and concerned application in conflict-vulnerable societies, which is needed (Lund 2004 ).
OECD DAC
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is largely a co-ordination body with no direct authority in international affairs and on Africa, but with considerable influence in the development of guidelines for action. OECD DAC 2001: 31-32. 17 Besides the attempts of LAP and PCD to harmonize and implement policy coherence between donor-countries and -institutions, the OECD proposes a 'developmental peacekeeping' approach and highlights -under the aegis of the 'DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation' (CPDC) -special areas such as security sector reform, emerging issues and crisis countries, a development cooperation lens on terrorism prevention and the impacts of aid in situations of violent conflict. An enhancement of the DAC-guidelines can be expected in the near future.
to misconceived programs that may have symbolic value but little practical effect. … The dynamics of conflict are discontinuous and sequential approaches are far less effective than "joined up" strategies that combine all policy tools in a coherent package of inducements and restraints" (OECD 2005: 6) .
The G8 (and Its Africa Action Plan)
It took long until the G8 countries could agree to devote resources and efforts to helping Africa prevent and manage its conflicts in order to promote social stability and create a more enabling environment for development. At its summit in Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002 the G8 declared its willingness to assist Africa directly by its own efforts to undertake peace support operations. Therefore a G8 Africa Action Plan was signed, unfortunately without including an agreed set of conflict causes.
Critically, the initiative sprang from African nations themselves, but African leaders bowed to Western pressure alike. The African leaders called the West's bluff by signalling in the NEPAD-process their willingness to implement reforms. In return, it was hoped Western nations would raise the plight of Africa up their political agenda. At this point the G8 initiative stepped in.
The plan contains an initiative on peace and security. Unfortunately, it has no clear analytical basis; conflict causes have to be deducted from the objectives. The main aim of the initiative is to "provide technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional and sub-regional organizations are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent." Africa, with Western help, will be encouraged to form its own peacekeeping force and to enhance general conflict management capacities. In addition the G8 pledged support for ongoing conflict management efforts in countries such as the DRC, Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone. However, there is no common -G8 and NEPAD -understanding of conflict causes.
The Evian Summit (France) in 2003 reiterated these commitments and focused specifically on the pledge to provide support for an African capacity for peace operations. The three-step approach intends to create a joint plan for developing African capability to undertake peace support operations, to train African peace support forces, including through the development of regional centres of excellence to train military and civilian personnel in conflict prevention and peace support, and to better coordinate peacekeeping training initiatives. Special foci were put on reducing the number of small arms circulating in Africa, helping African countries rid themselves of anti-personnel mines, getting close scrutiny of the link between conflict and pillage of natural resources, ending illicit trafficking of weapons and outlawing mercenary activities. While all those aspects seem important, there is hardly any convincing analytical backbone for the formulation of priorities or the sequence of actions.
Some of the most powerful nation-states have developed their own concepts, although it is true that they frequently refer to the UN, the OECD DAC or the EU as common frameworks.
Here too, a short oversight might highlight the distinctions:
United Kingdom
Rhetorically, conflict prevention plays a big role in the UK's policy toward Africa in particu- 
"include political, economic and social exclusion, poor governance and corruption, manipulation of ethnicity, and abuse of human rights. Africa also needs to address the weaknesses of its regional security structures and conflict prevention mechanisms" (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002). 19
This was not exactly the result of a consultation process initiated by DFID on behalf of the co-ordination body: DFID put a consultation document on the web titled 'the causes of con- The UK stands out for emphasising security and reconciliation -the two peace-building categories that are non-traditional within development cooperation -as well as for its emphasis on projects that are not specific to a recipient country but are regional, global or thematic in scope (DFID 2003 and coordination. Seen in international perspective, the system is highly innovative, and has influenced other donor governments. But, the CCP system still requires more strategic clarity. 22 The UK has geographic and thematic strategies, but there seems to be a gap at both ends of the spectrum. In some cases projects lack connection to a country strategy because there is no country strategy. In other cases, there is a country strategy to which some but not all projects are linked. In yet others, a strategy can be derived from project documentation or other sources (such as interviews), but it has not been written down and formalised (DFID 
United States of America
U.S. interests in Africa were for a long time considered to be commercial in essence. The September 11 aftermath is beginning to modify policy goals over time (Berman 2004 , Hentz 2004 2004-2009. 27 Guided by the prior idea to protect US national interests, the strategy stresses the objective to "avert and resolve local and regional conflicts to preserve peace". By "building the foundations for stability and addressing the root causes of conflict" development assistance shall be provided. The strategy defines causes of conflict as following: wealth, power, and ambitions." 28 Although the official papers portrays the US focus on conflict resolution and regional stability, the real impetus of Washington stays clear: In the early years of this Millennium, the US policy towards Africa remains defined by exogenous factors. Africa's place in US policy remains distant and marginalized. However, Africa has gained strategic importance for the US simply because of its oil reserves, and Africa is critical to the American war on terrorism. 29 Africa's conflicts aren't ignored, but the attention they get, are framed by Washington's war on terrorism. The "Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009" emphasizes that development assistance "must be fully aligned with U.S. foreign policy". The plan leaves no doubts, that the US's own security has the highest priority in relation to Africa. This policy rewards friends and allies of the US while other African states have to cope with less and less financial support from the US. 30 This suggests that a sober conflict analysis quickly shifts to the background when short-term "national interests" dominate the decision-making process.
France
France can be regarded as the nation-state in Europe with the best information network, influence and interests in security matters on the African continent. However, the paradigm of conflict prevention was never very prominent in Paris. Although France "wants not just to act in response to the crises, but be more effective in preventing and resolving them by defining a joint approach" 32 , there is wide discrepancy between rhetoric and action in Paris' policies towards the continent (Kroslak 2004: 80) . Once more, recent initiatives show that France focuses its efforts on post-conflict activities in contrast to the expressed political will to replace a 'thinking exclusively geared to short-term efficacy by a vision, by more foresight'. 33 The recent violent crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Togoboth harmful to French interests, but apparently not expected in Paris -suggest that the analytical capacities with regard to conflict prevention are limited.
Germany
Finally, Germany is only starting to consider itself a global foreign policy player, Berlin would not regard its own policy towards Africa as particularly important. However, when taking all financial contributions in multilateral frameworks into account, Germany remains an important actor. German conflict prevention in the 1990s remained an idea in search of a strategy (Matthies 1999 , Thiel 2000 , but since the beginning of the new millennium this edge: contrary to Paris and Washington, the German government made big efforts to formalize its conflict prevention policy. Additionally, the BMZ has sharpened the focus on prevention in its planning procedures by using an extensive set of crisis indicators (catalogue for crisis indicators) designed to detect the need for preventive measures early on, so that programmes and project portfolios can be adapted to these needs (Spelten 2004: 172 f.) . 36 Berlin has made crisis prevention a guideline for, and a task that involves all fields of, national policy. But, although progress in the German conflict prevention policy can be detected, the Government still lacks to meet its own claim in terms of practical and conceptual implementation.
In its more general (not Africa-specific) policy paper on conflict prevention, the government adopts a distinction of structural and procedural conflict causes (without naming them). 37 In 34 The renewed red-green coalition agreement of October 2002 emphasises conflict prevention as one major objective of German development assistance (www.bundesregierung.de/Regierung/ Koalitionsvertrag-I.-Praeambel-,1766/IX.-Gerechte-Globalisierung-De.htm ; access 03/14/2005). 35 The sector program should develop concepts and instruments for implementation in focus countries. This sector program was very active and commissioned numerous studies on a broad range of subjects related to conflict. 36 With the establishment of the Civil Peace Service (CPS; (Ziviler Friedensdienst: ZFD) in 1999 a completely new instrument was created. Furthermore the Government has established the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF). Both ZIF and ZFD provide further education and training on conflict prevention so that appropriately trained and qualified experts can be deployed to assist groups, communities and governments in conflict to develop their capacities to handle conflicts non-violently (Fleischmann 2004 , Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung 2002 , Plattfrom Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung 2003 . Within the framework of the Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), the Government, church and non-state executing agencies and political foundations are intensifying exchange, discussing concrete conceptual and methodological developments and exploring possibilities for improving mutual consultation, cooperation and coordination. Acknowledging the fact, that a multi-dimensional approach is essential to counter the challenges by implementing durable peace, FriEnt is an instrument of addressing the problems of multi-layered cooperation between ministries and departments of very different institutions. 2004). The national Utstein report by the GTZ identifies both conceptual confusion and a very variable degree of strategic consistency and thinking in project planning and country portfolios (GTZ 2003: 19-21, 25) . Due to these deficiencies, one essential element is the objective to increase the coherence of crisis prevention measures within the Federal Government.
The Government has set up an 'Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention' (September 2004) in order to anchor crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral task in the overall policy of the Federal Government. 43 In sum, evidence of growing professionalism in the handling of peace and conflict issues since the mid-1990s, with a further strengthening since 2000, can be detected. New fields of action and also new instruments were established. But while many strategies and experiences are already available for post-conflict reconstruction, there is still a disturbing lack of know-how and experience available for true crisis prevention. At present, many project planning documents frequently make only passing reference to conflict as an issue. The process of adapting country portfolios to reflect new priorities after the comprehensive concept was laid out is not yet completed.
Taken all together the picture of the various conceptual starting points of conflict prevention policies by major bilateral and multilateral donors is bewildering. More general policies (poverty reduction!) and already existing tools might influence the analysis of conflict, which is hardly intellectually acceptable.
What the long list of potential conflict causes suggests, is that:
1. There is no consensus on conflict causes between bilateral donors and influential multinational organisations;
2. There is not necessarily even a consensus between different ministries or departments of the same government/organisation;
42 Die Bundesregierung (2004) 7 (English Version) . 43 Taking the British Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool as role models, the German Government wants to adopt this British model and to verify, if a pilot scheme can be implemented (Müller 2005: 9) .
3. There is much confusion in the use of conflict types and indicators and therefore doubts are permitted as to the effectiveness or existence of an overall analytical framework;
4. The specification of conflict causes evolves over time-there is obviously a need to adapt policy to new insights. However, it is never clear if a new set of 'official' conflict causes is the result of analytical progress. Changes in policies are not even commented.
5.
The conflict causes singled out in some instances fit the policy of single actors; with the World Bank putting forward socio-economic factors and waving a strong progovernment bias (its partners are predominantly African governments). The British concern with collapsing states and lack of mechanisms for conflict management is in line with a pronounced readiness to intervene even militarily (Sierra Leone); etc.
However, the analysis is not always in line with the responses offered.
What is striking is the multiple and prominent reference to poverty as a cause of (or poverty reduction as a solution to) African conflicts; this seems to be the smallest common denomina- (Verstegen 2001: 5) .
This quotation should warn against simplistic approaches. The tendency to pick segments of conflict causes might be explained best by the preponderance of narrow departmental interests. Contradictions of sectoral donor policies can easily be found. The absence of a comprehensive view on conflict and peace including the acknowledgement of the inter-relatedness of conflict dynamics with own activities leads the international community into a situation where conflict preventive effects take place only at random. While the debate in humanitarian assistance (Anderson 1999) has achieved a certain standard, e.g. automatically taking negative effects of own actions into account, this did not happen yet for the bulk of devel- 44 The New Partnership for Africa's Development initiative (NEPAD; October 2001) by African Leaders also offers a strange understanding of conflict: According to the document that contains a 'Peace and Security Initiative' African states are just 'vulnerable' to conflict, conflict causes are nowhere explicitly stated (para 73).
opmental action, where unintended consequences are still rarely under scrutiny let alone conceptually incorporated in project designs.
Conclusions and Perspectives
Resuming chapter 2, 3 and 4, we can assert that practice and academia are faced with four major forms of misinterpretations of violent conflicts in Africa -potentially leading to erroneous policies:
1. Oversimplification (frequently: poverty as prime cause of conflict)
2. Lack of focus (unsystematic addition of conflict causes)
3. Lack of conceptual clarity (no distinction between different types of conflict factors)
4. State-centrism (Lack of concern for transnational phenomena, and non-state actors). 45 Additionally, the lack of a vision of what would be the prerequisites for a peaceful society is becoming clearer every day. 46 However, an outspoken critic of the new agenda between conflict prevention and resolution warns that 'liberal peace' as he calls the concept would reflect 'a radical developmental agenda of social transformation' (Duffield 2001: 11) . There is indeed a heavy dose of presumptuousness when westerners draw up ideal societies for Africans. In fact, policy-makers and academics from North and South need to discuss more openly what they are aiming at. In the absence of that discussion actors should have at least some guiding principles for understanding the challenges they are facing.
Is there something like a well-suited, maybe even Africa-specific analytical framework? A first response might be that it would be hazardous to simplify a complex picture, 'Africa' might not offer an appropriate level of generalisation. Anyhow, broader approaches integrating structural conflict factors including state failure, flawed democratisation, inefficient institutions, politics of identity, competition for scarce or precious resources as well as the trau-45 Reno (2001: 198) challenges 'the international expectation that all Africans live within political units that at least resemble states'. A sharp critique on Reno, Chabal and Daloz (1999) , and others is offered by Joseph (2002) . 46 The academic literature on causes of conflict frequently names the absence of democracy as a main factor for uncivil societies -and rightly so. However, the linkage is more complicated. Although democracy might make violence unnecessary it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for domestic peace. Stable autocratic regimes might be more capable in preventing violent internal conflicts than unstable democracies, especially in least developed countries after conflict. Being more liberal than dictatorships, democratic societies encourage dissent but might not be responsive enough to concede substantive demands. Therefore social groups resort to unconstitutional channels and violent means to show their discontent. Political change can compound the problem further. Specifically the process of democratisation rarely occurs smoothly and in linear fashion. The effectiveness in preventing violent means may not be given by these (fragile) new democracies with regard to weakness in the specific institutional design (see Burnell 2004 ).
matic experiences and structural consequences of colonial rule and war offer a better analytical framework than one-dimensional explanations. 47 Since both spheres are more (practitioners) or less (researchers) infected by the abovementioned common misinterpretations of conflict, it could be useful to find a common way out of it. Here, the policy-sphere has to offer a valid formula, that still needs to be refined, tested and specified for different arenas and policies: the leitmotif of 'structural stability' which has been adopted in 1997 by the OECD DAC, but has unfortunately remained a 'second-rank' concept. The definition given by the EU is broad enough to cover most of the con- (European Commission 1996) .
When carefully developed, the argument contained in this definition and the slightly differ One core assumption is that all these elements are explicitly inter-linked and mutually reinforcing. The reverse picture of 'structural instability' can be easily derived from that list (social injustice, absence of democracy, exclusion, etc.). Here as well, the 'building blocks' are inter-linked and together form a 'conflict order' -they might represent a set of appropriate 'root causes' of conflict. Other conflict factor-types (aggravating factors, prolonging factors, triggers) could then be easily derived. To draw on structural stability for the development of an appropriate analytical framework for African conflicts has one additional advantage: the term itself exists for some years (even longer in natural sciences!) and it has received acceptance in the framework of the OECD DAC. 47 Deng 1996; a systematic view is presented by Engel and Mehler 2000.
What is even more relevant is the possibility to escape apodictic judgements about the viability of states and societies of the whole continent. The drawing up of 'profiles' of structural stability/instability would reveal that there are distinct and variable shortcomings or potentials in different building-blocks of structural stability for varying African states or societies.
One major shortcoming of this approach is its focus on structure. It needs to be complemented by an analysis of actors and behaviour. Focusing on agency and thereby taking into account the strategies, motives and behaviour of local stakeholders should not be portrayed as an alternative to structural approaches, but rather as a complementary (second) step in analysis. 48 One of the major flaws in the way conflict prevention is put into practice currently is to remain very state-focused, while we know that conflicts develop frequently locally and then easily cross existing borders becoming an issue for sub-regional organisations. Conflicts are not confined to the territory of a (increasingly fictitious) nation-state, a growing 'transnationalism' is associated with contemporary violent conflict (Engel/Mehler 2005) . The weakness of state structures is an established feature very familiar to African citizens in a sizeable proportion of the continent. The discussion on the use of cooperation with 'rotten' or underperforming state structures has been engaged in development cooperation for some time now, it is unavoidable in respect to crisis prevention: On the one hand the state (or the judiciary system or the security apparatus) failed to function in resolving/managing conflicts in several cases, but on the other hand development cooperation risks to contribute to its further degradation, if it is only cooperating with some traditional leaders or the civil society (Debiel et al. 2005) . But it is clear that problems and solutions can be found on two other levels than the nation-state: on the local and the border-transcending sub-regional level.
This might best be exemplified by focusing on the security sector: In West Africa's major war zone spreading now from Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire conflict has its local roots, but its trans-border dynamics. There are local 'violence actors' ranging from traditional hunters to armed students movements as well as international 'violence actors' ranging from ECOWAS peace-keepers to armed refugees hired by the parties in conflict. They might be as important as the state actors but receive little analytical attention. An answer to this challenge may reside in the building of a 'sub-regional security architecture' which would necessitate a conscious networking between public, private and local security forces. 49
48 Some valuable work has recently been offered from this perspective -again mainly on material motivations (e.g. Jean/Rufin 1996; Herbst 2000 , Berdal/Malone 2000 . There might be a need to map violence actors as well according to their protective capacities in the sense of emerging oligopolies of violence (Mehler 2004) . 49 Shearing and Kempa 2000. Some more ideas explaining why such an approach has its merits can be found in de Waal (2002).
The delimitation of responsibilities between those forces is crucial. In their current form of co-existence, vigilantes and other violent actors are probably inimical to democracy and therefore structural stability (Baker 2002) . Of course there will be conflicts of competence between central and local actors, but this is exactly why the issue must be addressed in a conscious manner. Recognition of those non-public actors could be a formal and explicit one, following clear criteria and including the obligation to respect human rights, a kind of certification rather than a gratification scheme.
The argumentation of this paper offers a divergent reading and deducts lessons for a more realistic conflict prevention policy towards Africa. The holistic view on a society's capacity of living in peace with itself and its neighbours -inherent in the notion of structural stabilityoffers a framework for analysis and action as well as a basis of discussion between donors and recipients of development aid (Lock 2002) . A parallel enlargement of the focus of attention from the national towards the local and the sub-regional level is the appropriate answer to the declining, while still existing importance of the nation-state in war-torn parts of Africa.
The identification of escalation patterns and a clear conceptual distinction between conflict sustaining/prolonging factors and 'root causes' of conflict are important for correct analyses (academics) and efficient strategies (practitioners). Finally, there is a wide gap in the understanding of conflict causes between different actors involved in conflict prevention policies that should be overcome by frank exchanges of viewpoints.
There is every reason to believe that an increasing number of African countries will face violent conflict in the decades to come. Therefore, it would be helpful if more African policymakers, aid bureaucracies and researchers would be familiar with appropriate approaches of conflict analysis and with adequate designs of a stable peace order.
